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Philosophic strands certainly underlie the characteristic claims of modernism, the creed 
whose foundational assumptions postmodern philosophy repudiates. This paper defends 
the thesis that three Ghanaian philosophers, who have been affiliated to the University 
of Ghana, Legon, have successfully created and defended a systematic and humanistic 
approach to philosophy in the African context that merits the status of a tradition of 
philosophy; and that these pioneers of a Legon tradition of philosophy espouse an eclectic, 
“trans-modernist” outlook that appropriates aspects of modernism and rejects some post-
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Introduction 
 Three Ghanaian philosophers – Kwasi Wiredu, W. E. 
Abraham, and Kwame Gyekye - have had extensive association 
with the Department of Philosophy1, University of Ghana, Legon 
and exerted decisive influence on its philosophical orientation and 
the development of the current corpus of African philosophy. From 
their thoughts and orientation has evolved what I term a “trans-
modernist” philosophical praxis. I have argued elsewhere that their 
normative emphasis configures a coherent discourse that justifies 
joining them into a tradition of Ghanaian political philosophy2. 
1  Now called Department of Philosophy and Classics.
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I limit my ambitions here to asserting their role in pioneering a 
nascent Legon tradition of normative philosophy. 
 By “trans-modernity”, I allude to a conscious appropriation 
of foundational concepts and principles of the modernist canon for 
ideas and objectives that those elemental blocks of the canon can 
neither propose nor sustain, and to doing so without a methodic 
rejection of modernist thought. The Legon philosophers displayed 
dexterity in negotiating their conceptual responses through the 
modernist framework, without claiming to be philosophizing 
beyond it. Modernist concepts and aspirations were their vehicles, 
but they intentionally moved these vehicles toward destinations that 
could not entirely be claimed by modernist visions. Thus, they can 
be identified neither with modernism nor postmodernity, as they 
selectively appropriated and rejected features of both.  
 The philosophical orientation and praxis of these three 
thinkers, which configure the tradition of philosophy to which I 
allude in the first paragraph of this paper, are formed around rational 
humanism, a philosophical method, and three substantive themes. 
These themes are (1) the relevance of tradition to modernity, (2) the 
appropriate form of democracy as means of legitimating political 
power, and (3) the relative status of person and community. Despite 
their several differences, their convergences on method and thematic 
concerns justify joining them into a tradition. The three themes 
reflect concerns that emerge from a postcolonial condition, and the 
three philosophers responded to them, along with several others, 
as members of the first and second generations of professionally 
trained Africans philosophers in postcolonial Africa, such as 
Hountondji (1983) and Oruka (1990, 1997). It would therefore be 
misleading to insist that their philosophical concerns and practice 
place them in an exclusive category apart from those of other 20th 
century African philosophers. However, the claim that the works 
of three Ghanaian philosophers disclose a distinctive approach to 
African philosophical practice can also be established. 
 Democratic theory, the relationship between person and 
state, and the evaluation of traditions of thought are recurrent 
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themes in political theory. But unlike other African philosophers, 
the reflections on these themes by the Legon thinkers appear in 
two interlocking modes. The first is reactive, and responds to the 
pejorative characterizations of African thought and culture, mainly 
by Western thinkers, that stretch for hundreds of years and are 
discernible in the works of Hegel (1956) in the 19th century and, in 
more recent times, those by Horton (1971). The second is expository, 
and endeavors to expound their own thinking on these themes and 
on the philosophical fertility of African traditions of thought. In 
the Legon philosophers, the two modes always dovetail into each 
other, as their insistence on the relevance of African traditions to 
modernity invariably reflected in their critique of the denigration 
of African thought by Western thinkers and their confidence in the 
value of the constructive tenets of African traditions for modern 
life. 
The conundrum of the modern and postmodern: A critical 
perspective
 Before I begin to address my main subject, trans-modernism, 
it would be appropriate to make some drawn-out introductory 
remarks about modernity and postmodernity. Most narratives of 
the story of the project of modernity recognize its genesis in efforts 
by Enlightenment philosophers and their followers to develop 
objective science, moral universalism and aesthetic principles 
“according to their inner logic” (Habermas, 1981, p. 9). The story 
will argue how these aspirations and the efforts expended to achieve 
them bred, in the opinion of Habermas (1981), expectations that 
the arts and sciences would promote the control of natural forces, 
an understanding of the world and of the self, moral progress, the 
justice of institutions, and the happiness of human beings (pp. 8-9). 
These aspirations make evident that the intellectual framework 
of modernity contains at least three salient strands of philosophic 
thinking: metaphysics, epistemology and normative theory. 
 Several authors have identified a prejudicial streak at the 
core of the metaphysics of modernism, which projects the being 
of the Western human as ontologically superior to other forms of 
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human existence, and as exemplifying human being-ness per se 
(Serequeberhan,  1998, pp. 142-143; Eze,  1998, p. 214). And cogent 
arguments have been advanced to indicate how these claims are not 
conclusions of pure abstract speculation on being, but conclusions 
saturated with intention to demonstrate that racial distinctions are 
necessary and rational, and on the basis of this to Europeanize 
humanity by substituting the model and standard of European 
personality for the fact of human being-ness. Serequeberhan (1998) 
portrays this as a “metaphysical pretext” (p.145) and “pervasive 
bias located in modernity’s self-consciousness of itself” (p. 142); 
a bias which, no doubt, constitutes a fallacy of composition but 
which places the very existence of the ‘other’ into question, 
thereby depriving the largest portion of the human race the status 
of humanity. 
 The prejudicial metaphysics of modernity had its most 
candid expression in the philosophies of Hume, Kant and Hegel, 
foremost exponents of Enlightenment philosophy. Hume asserts in 
an infamous footnote to his essay “Of national characters,” in his 
Essays, moral, political and literary, among others that: “I am apt to 
suspect the negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for 
there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the 
whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion 
than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or 
speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, 
no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of 
the whites, such as the ancient GERMAN the present TARTARS 
have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of 
government, or some other particular. Such a uniform and constant 
difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature 
had not made an original distinction betwixt these breeds of men. 
Not to mention our colonies, there are NEGROE slaves dispersed 
all over EUROPE, of which none ever discovered any symptom of 
ingenuity” (Hume [1742/1777], 1985, p. 629). In Observations on 
the feeling of the beautiful and sublime, Kant outlines a taxonomy 
of race in which the European is atop, and has this to say of the 
African:  “The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that 
Legon Journal of the Humanities 29.2 (2018) Page | 5
Ajei, M. O./ Legon Journal of the Humanities 29.2 (2018)
arises above the trifling. Mr. Hume challenges anyone to cite a 
single example in which a Negro has shown talents and asserts that 
among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who are transported 
elsewhere from their countries, although many of them have even 
been set free, still not a single one was ever found who presented 
anything great in art or science or any other praiseworthy quality, 
even though some continually rise aloft from the lowest rabble, 
and through special gifts earn respect in the world. So fundamental 
is the difference between these two races of man, and it appears 
to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in color”   (Kant 
[(1764, 1960), pp. 110-111. For his part, Hegel’s denigration of 
Africa proceeds from his claim that Africa is outside the framework 
of history, and has therefore contributed nothing to world history 
(Hegel, 1956, p. 99). 
 Irele (1983) rightly argues that sediments of their 
metaphysics of the person pervaded post-Enlightenment practical 
philosophy and stimulated the beginnings of anthropology in the 
19th century, which in turn legitimated the ideology of Western 
colonial domination of Africa (pp. 12-14). Hume’s infamous bigotry 
had immense philosophical consequences. It certainly influenced 
Kant’s philosophical anthropology, which sought to prove that 
the African is less human than Whites (Eze, 1997, p.122). This 
pronouncement is rightfully interpreted as contributing to establish 
a threshold notion of moral personhood according to which some 
races are “excluded from full membership of the moral/political 
Community” (Mills  2005, p. 181). What this means is that 
Africans are disqualified from benefitting from the prescriptions 
of the categorical imperative3. Moellendorf (1992) observes, the 
justification of colonialism and slavery in terms of the European 
mission of civilization was the ideological raw material at hand for 
Hegel (p. 253). In fact, Hegel was emphatic in his endorsement of 
the slavery of Africans:  “Negroes are enslaved by Europeans and 
sold to America. Bad as this may be, their lot in their own land is 
even worse, since there a slavery quite as absolute exists” (Hegel, 
3 A foundational principle in Kant’s ethics, which prescribes that all human beings be treated as ends 
in themselves but not as means to some other end.
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1956, p. 96). 
 Such ideology of the Enlightenment, grounded in the 
denigrated reality of non-European forms of existence, and its 
residues, justified the practices of the slave trade. Before the 
nineteenth century, justification of slavery was founded primarily 
on religious grounds – on rescuing Africans from their ‘primitive 
religions’ by introducing them to Christianity, the enlightened 
form of religious faith and practice. And as Stocking (1987), a 
historian of nineteenth century anthropology indicates, ideas about 
the ‘inferiority’ of non-Europeans justified European colonial 
adventure: 
Civilizing efforts on behalf of dark-skinned savages 
could, over time, eliminate savagery from the world, 
not by destroying savage populations, but by modifying 
their hereditary incapacity. In the meantime – which 
might be shorter or longer depending on the weight 
one gave to present as opposed to cumulative past 
experience of it was both scientifically and morally 
respectable for civilized Europeans to take up the white 
man’s burden. (p. 237)
Enlightenment philosophy underlies the epistemology of 
modernity, which is characterized by obsession with infallibility as 
the seal of epistemic certainty and the distinctive feature, reason. 
This fixation is not confined to discourses on the groundwork of 
justifiable truth and scientific progress. It applies also to progress 
in ethical capacity, social change and happiness. Undoubtedly, all 
these functions of reason are noticeable in the origins of Western 
philosophy, especially in Plato and Aristotle. Plato prescribed 
reason as the best ruler of the human psyche and the institutions of 
society, and the grounds of epistemic certainty are inherited from 
the status of apodicticity in Aristotelian logic4. But Aristotle did not 
insist on infallibility as the defining feature of certainty, as is shown 
by his affirmation of synthetic truths as grounds for justification. 
He conclusively affirms the validity of empirical knowledge in his 
4   Here, apodictic refers to propositions that are demonstrably, necessarily or self-evidently the case.
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Posterior analytics5. On the other hand Modernist epistemology, 
beginning with Descartes’ discovery of the cogito and Kant’s 
re-affirmation of apodictic certainty6, rule out the primacy of 
knowledge by induction and elevate with vehemence the pure 
activity of reason to the zenith of human capacity. With this, they 
enthrone reason as an unimpeachable ground of justifiable agency. 
These Enlightenment obsessions have framed the standard test 
in epistemological inquiry in Western philosophy, and today the 
notion of epistemic certainty as infallible and universalizable truth 
continues to linger in the position that theories are nothing more 
than organized epistemological orientations “intended to explain 
universal phenomena across space and time” (Miike, 2006, p. 20). 
 Within modernist epistemology, then, fundamental concepts 
of philosophy - and therefore of human thought - were set forth 
as specimens of culture-neutral reason. This referred merely to the 
reasoning of the Enlightenment and its intellectual heritage, and 
yet the ‘inner logic’ of this heritage was taken to validate these 
concepts. The history of Western thought, in Etherington’s view 
(1996), has disclosed the logic that sustains this mode of reasoning 
to be the logic that sustains grand theories such as Liberalism, 
Marxism and Modernism, and their concomitant universalizing 
tendencies (p. 30). 
 For Lyotard (1984), who is credited with introducing the 
term “postmodernism” into philosophical literature, these features 
of modernist thought do evoke incredulity (p. xxiv); and to Eitiyebo 
(2014) they are pernicious and harmful (p. 68). Lyotard argues 
that history teaches decisively that knowledge and value emerge 
from “narratives” - interrelated and mutually fortifying discourses 
within the intellectual scheme of a culture - within which the 
validity of all claims within that culture can be found embedded 
(p.8). But modernity assigns privilege to its knowledge narrative 
5   See Book i.13. And also in Book II.19: II.19, where he states that knowledge of principles are 
neither innate nor are they acquired from nothing. They must be acquired through a distinctive 
potentiality we have, and that this potentiality is sense perception. The chain goes like this: What 
is meant here is that perception leads to memory, which in turn underlies experience; and from 
experience we acquire the basis for Understanding
6   In Kant, as in Aristotle, the apodeictic certainty of a proposition is established when we know it 
to be necessarily true.
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and constructs a “metanarrative” out of its epistemic and normative 
claims. It is to such unjustified construction that postmodernism 
is obliged to remain ceaselessly skeptical or “incredulous”. And 
such incredulity is heightened by the universalizing tendencies of 
modernity, which remains totalitarian by imposing conformity on 
other discourses; thereby oppressing, marginalizing, or silencing 
them. This is what makes modernity a pernicious framework of 
knowledge. 
 The assumptions and conclusions of the modernist vision of 
human progress mutated into systems of oppression and domination, 
manifest among others in the colonial dispossession of African 
agency and a resultant ‘crisis of conscience. (Nkrumah, 1970, p. 
78). Recognition by Western philosophers and scholars of the scale 
of destruction generated by the modernist canon in the second 
half of the twentieth century prompted “an  inevitable moment of 
disenchantment; a sense of void and despair” about “the failure of 
the totalizing myth of the organized Eurocentric superstructure” 
(Monteiro-Ferreira, 2014, p. 92). This precipitated postmodernity. 
 I am concerned in this paper with postmodernity as a 
primary conceptual category, rather than its manifold expression 
and interpretation in cultural forms. I therefore understand it to 
denote an overarching intellectual approach to the production, 
dissemination, and evaluation of cultural goods that revolts against 
modernity and its assumptions. Among the principal features of this 
approach are a critique of hegemonic perspectives and dogmatic 
commitment; a critique of normative truths as universal paradigm; 
emphasis on intellectual and practical pluralism, and a celebration 
of difference; and a critique of oppressive paradigms (Montero-
Ferreira, 2014, pp. 101-102). What this means is that postmodernists 
dismiss Modernist universalism, foundationalism, and obsession 
with reason. In ontology, epistemology, and ethics, postmodernity 
upholds the validity of the particular and the provisional, as 
opposed to the privileged place of the general and the universal 
in modernist thinking (Parpart, 1995, p. 16). The postmodern thus 
brings awareness of the significance of difference and otherness, 
and value to plurality and partiality; and therewith affirms the value 
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of inclusive thinking as opposed to the binary and diametrically 
opposed “either/or” categories of modernity (p. 17). This, in turn, 
highlights paradox, ambiguity, indeterminacy and contingency as 
reasonable attributes of postmodern thinking. 
 Baumann (1992) has reasoned that such characterization 
of postmodernity may seem to suggest comprehensive consensus 
on its meaning and ambit of activity. But disagreement on the 
exact nature of the postmodern revolt is also prevalent (p. xxiv). 
Questions endure about whether the shift in intellectual posture 
that characterizes postmodernity constitutes a change of paradigm 
at all, or whether it should be conceived merely as a movement, or 
a project, or a condition. One such recurring question is whether 
or not the intellectual space occupied by postmodernists can be 
sufficiently distinguished, as they intimately inhabit the structure 
that they critique. A range of skeptical responses have emerged to 
this question. Some, like Hassan’s (1996) perceive postmodernism 
as evidence of a re-visioning of modernism (p. 389). The 
postmodern demonstrates the case that the culture of modernism 
“insists on old orders in clever or current guises, and, with the 
means of communication at hand, inhibits and restrains” (Hassan, 
1996, p. 388). Hence the postmodern insistence on renouncing the 
modernist paradigm is an “oblique and always perilous movement, 
constantly risking falling back within what is being deconstructed” 
(Derrida, 1996, p. 345).
 It is not difficult to fathom why the postmodernist revolt 
defies unanimous characterization.  The sphere of its activity is 
indeterminate. It is inextricably implicated in the paradigm it contests, 
and yet claims to be operating “post” it. Thus, postmodernity tends 
to install, and then subvert, the very concepts it challenges: it shares 
elements of the modern and exhibit difference to it simultaneously. 
It simultaneously affiliates and revolts to it. Accordingly, one 
cannot posit an absolutely antithetical relationship between these 
concepts. Hence it is difficult to construe the relationship between 
them as one of complete historical and theoretical rupture, and find 
a single vision that canonizes the postmodern. In spite of these 
difficulties that pertain finding a unified vision of the postmodern 
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critique, it is generally accepted that features of this conceptual 
shift away from modernism are sufficiently delineated to ground it 
as an independent and cogent critique of modernity. I take this view 
in this paper.
 Postmodernity and postcolonial African philosophy
 The significance of postmodernist thought for African life 
is a theme that continues to jostle for attention in postcolonial 
scholarship. Particularly, the effect of postmodernist thinking 
on, and its utility for, humanistic studies in postcolonial Africa 
continues to be a matter of hot debate. Some authors emphasize the 
analogous concerns shared by philosophers in formerly colonized 
countries and postmodernists, such as elaborating manifestoes 
of and intellectual pluralism to establish affinity between the 
two intellectual practices. Spivak (1993), for instance, considers 
postcoloniality as deconstruction of “the heritage of imperialism” 
(p. 281). Eze and Ramose have echoed this position for the African 
context. Eze (1998) notes that postcolonial African philosophy 
ought to be “productively deconstructive” and “find ways to 
make sense, and speak of, the multiplicities and the pluralisms” of 
African experiences (p. 219); and Ramose (1999) cautions African 
philosophers to “abandon the path of mimetic philopraxis – the 
uncritical imitation of the life of non-Africans – and pursue the 
route of the authentic liberation of the continent” (p. 7). Yet, others 
perceive the aims of postmodernists as imaginatively different from 
African visions of humanistic achievement.
 Appiah (1991) has offered perspectives that continue 
to refresh philosophical interest in this topic. In “Is the Post- in 
Postmodernism the Post- in Postcolonial?”, Appiah explores 
the relations between conditions of “postcoloniality” and 
“postmodernism”  in the context of African novels written in the 
1950s and the late sixties. He argues that novelists of the 1950s 
endorsed forms of realism and displayed proclivity for nationalism 
and traditionalism by legitimizing ethnographic inventions of 
uniform national histories and traditions; and that novelists of the 
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late 1960s challenged these earlier narratives and instead celebrated 
the prevailing ‘multiple existence’ in African life (p. 353, p. 349). 
As such, these latter novelists championed postmodern techniques 
and could be categorized as “political postmodernism” (pp. 352-
353). But these postcolonial political postmodernists celebrated 
the virtues of a universal ethic, in contrast to Western-inspired 
postmodernism for which legitimate knowledge and values are 
necessarily decentered (p. 353). 
 In like manner, Serequeberhan (1998) contends that 
“hermeneutically elucidate[ing] that which has remained hidden” in 
the ethnocentric metaphysics that constitutes a bias in modernity’s 
self-consciousness of itself imposes an indispensable post-modern 
task on contemporary African philosophical practice (pp. 142-
143, 156). This task of de-structuring the “meta-narrative” through 
which modernity constituted itself, the “negative and critical” task 
of peeling off layers of lies and misrepresentations about Africa 
that grounded colonial assumptions and policy and continues to 
sustain a crisis of conscience; must be undertaken in tandem with a 
positive task, one of highlighting the merits of Africa’s intellectual 
legacy for human culture. Both of these negative and positive tasks 
of African philosophy aim at the goal of reclaiming agency for the 
African subject in the voicing of his or her own history and for 
constructing a constructive future. The features of postmodernism 
outlined earlier in this section justify considering the work described 
by Appiah and Serequeberhan as postmodern acts. 
 But if postmodern, they constitute as well Afrocentric7 
postures that drive the conceptual responses of the postcolonial 
African philosopher. Tenets of postmodernist and African 
philosophical concerns intersect at several identifiable points. 
The postmodernist rejection of modernist universalization and 
impositions of Western cultural experience, and rejection of the 
modernist deprecation of other cultural perspectives, is widespread 
in African philosophical practice. So too is the postmodern emphasis 
on provincial and diverse cultural sites as locations of valid claims 
7   I allude to Molefe Asante’s definition of Afrocentrism as requiring  “regaining our own [African] 
platforms, standing on our own cultural spaces, and believing that our way of viewing the universe is 
just as valid as any” (Asante, 1998, p. 8).
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to knowledge and values. African philosophical deconstruction of 
modernist assumptions in ontology, epistemology and ethics began 
in earnest at the beginning of the 20th century8 and continues to 
the present-day. Much effort has gone into elaboration of African 
philosophical perspectives on metaphysical and social realities, 
thereby stressing the postmodernist validity of diversity. Thus, 
African philosophy, like postmodernity, may be considered a counter 
hegemonic discourse in as much as it seeks to convey a mechanism 
for challenging the universalist pretentions of modernist theorists. 
So, where may the authors of the Legon tradition be located in this 
maze of the modern, postmodern and postcolonial? 
The trans-modernism character of the Legon tradition of 
African philosophy
 Given my perception of postmodernism as a revolt against 
the modernist paradigm, it is time to consider whether at all, 
and if so to what extent, it has exerted influence on the thinking 
of the pioneers of the Legon tradition of African philosophy. We 
have seen Appiah and Serequeberhan assert the coincidence, at 
several points, of postmodern and postcolonial African critiques 
of modernism. Undoubtedly, the Legon philosophers addressed 
philosophical concerns in ways that can be labeled as postmodernist. 
For instance, Wiredu’s insistence that truth is nothing but opinion, 
or “a view from some point; and there are as many truths as there 
are points of view” (Wiredu, 1980, p. 115), certainly coincides 
with the postmodern rejection of epistemic foundationalism and 
universalism. Additionally, Wiredu (1996) admits that knowledge 
requires certainty, and that one can be certain of the truth or falsity 
of a claim; but unlike Descartes and neo-Cartesians, he insists 
that certainty does not imply infallibility (pp. 139-140). Likewise, 
Gyekye (1987) postulates paranormal cognition a possible form of 
knowledge (p. 202), subverting Hume’s position that all objects 
of knowledge are subject to either “relations of ideas” (a priori) 
and “matters of fact” (a posteriori). As is well known, Hume’s 
distinction and Kant’s affirmation of it in distinguishing “analytic” 
8      An instructive example of such is Danquah (1927).
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from “synthetic” propositions strengthened the view in Western 
philosophy that there are only two pathways to knowledge, 
accounted for by rationalism and empiricism. These challenges 
to modernist epistemology coincide with Abraham’s extortion 
to Africans to believe they have good reason for confidence in 
their own cultural roots, and for them to reject those elements of 
culture and habits of thought acquired during the colonial period, 
but which are “unsuited to the dignity and needs of independent 
peoples” (Abraham, 2015, p. vi). But in spite of these resemblances 
to postmodernism, I believe it is less credible to identify them as 
postmodernists, rather than as trans-modernists. 
 It is now time to expand my brief definition of ‘trans-
modernity’ in the introduction. I mean by it that the authors of 
the Legon tradition are neither modernist in the strictest sense 
of the term, nor postmodernist in the strictest sense of the term 
either. They do not wholly castigate the modernist framework of 
knowledge and values. They appropriate aspects of it and rework 
these aspects while navigating their way across the segments of 
the framework that they reject in their bid to achieve their own 
objectives, without wholesale castigation of the framework. 
They are neither ‘post’ modern, for they make no claims to 
having moved past modernity, and they did not align with central 
concepts of postmodernity. Rather, their works display a keen 
teleology and method: the method of charting a path by transiting 
modernist assumptions and conclusions, toward deconstructive 
and reconstructive philosophical goals. In doing so, they test and 
rupture the outer limits of modernity, and in the process construct 
the basis of a novel category of philosophical knowledge formation 
– trans-modernity – configured around a philosophical approach 
and a handful of themes. The method is rational humanism. And 
from the set of themes that engaged their philosophical attention 
I will choose an ethical and a meta-philosophical subject: ethical 
humanism and the relationship between tradition and modernity, to 
illustrate their trans-modernist outlook. Evidently, their method and 
themes are drawn from the central modernist concepts of rationality, 
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humanism and modernism.
 The ethical reflections of the Legon philosophers proceed 
from belief in the primary responsibility of human beings to shape 
and give meaning to their lives and world. This is illustrated in 
their firm rejection of extra-human agency as ultimate justification 
for ethical principles and conduct. Abraham (2015) describes 
‘rational humanism’ as a way of doing philosophy (pp. 6-7).  In 
his view, reason is a defining characteristic of human being-ness 
as  it equips human beings with sufficient resources to generate and 
constitute ultimate justifications for conduct (p. 7). Wiredu likewise 
emphatically endorses humanism as the foundation of morals 
(Wiredu, 1980, p. 6; 1992, pp. 193-194; 1996, pp. 65, 74-75, 193-
195). For him, one of the loftiest moral conducts, the “sympathetic 
identification of the interests of a person with those of others even 
at the cost of a possible abridgement of one’s own interests” (1992, 
p. 193), should be achieved through rational deliberation. Gyekye 
(1997) too explicitly embraces humanism of the rational kind (pp. 
259-260). For these philosophers, then, humans are the measure of 
all that is of human concern. 
 For these thinkers, an inherent feature of humans, which 
enables them to measure their concerns, is their rationality. The 
‘rational’ part of their ethical humanism alludes to their application 
of critical reasoning to affirm humanistic beliefs. This was displayed 
in a number of ways. Firstly, it showed in their unwavering 
commitment to the value and universal character of reason. All three 
of them justified their humanistic beliefs by critical and substantive 
reasons. Secondly, they all rejected Hegel’s racist9 annexation of 
reason exclusively to the European mind. Thus, Wiredu “rejects the 
possibility that some cultures may be of intrinsically greater merit 
than others because the people who founded them are, as human 
beings, somehow intrinsically better intellectually endowed than 
other human beings” (2004, p. 109). Further, they all placed great 
9  I follow Kwame Appiah in understanding ‘Racist’ views to be those that seek to construct, 
encourage or justify social systems, institutions and practices that accord social significance to the 
biological divisions of the human species and endeavor to distribute economic, social and political 
goods and ills, benefits and burdens, unequally between the various races. See Appiah, “Racisms”, 
pp. 5-8.
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emphasis on the clarity and precision of arguments as means of 
justifying claims. Such observation of the instrumental value of 
reason is certainly not anti-modernist. 
 Their work did not only ‘transit’ the modernist concept 
of rationality, by rejecting parochial attribution of the capacity to 
reason. They transited modernist aims as well. Implied in their 
rational humanistic deliberative method, as sufficiently stated in 
this section, is the belief in the ability of all cultures to reflect and 
philosophize on their experience. As first and second generation post 
colonial professional philosophers, they faced the task of responding 
to the denigration of African humanity perpetuated through the 
racist philosophical conclusions of modernist philosophers that 
sought to show that Euro-American paradigmatic forms of rational 
contemplation represent the thinking that real humans are capable 
of. And they resorted to reason to reject this claim of the racial 
nature of reason.
 Their trans-modernist predilections are also visible in their 
deliberation on the concepts of tradition and modernity. Let us 
understand by ‘traditional’ or ‘indigenous’ African culture the social 
systems that flourished before Africa’s encounter with Europe, 
features which are in practice and which continue to command the 
allegiance of a great number of Africans today. A tradition, in this 
sense, comprises a system for producing, organizing and consuming 
thought, with organizing principles that have the capacity to inspire, 
challenge and constrain its adherents. The question of the relevance 
of traditions to contemporary African life recurs so frequently in 
African philosophical discourses that Metz (2015) has observed 
that a distinct feature of this philosophy is its insistent attempt to 
ground theory in the normative resources of traditional African life 
(pp. 1-2). 
 The authors of the Legon tradition undoubtedly believed 
in the value of traditional resources for modern life. This is at 
variance with the insistent assault of modernist thinking on the 
importance of tradition exemplified, for instance in Horton’s (1971) 
characterization of traditional African thought systems as ‘closed’ 
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and intolerant of theoretical alternatives as opposed to ‘open’ 
Western scientific thought.  In Horton’s view, the ‘closeness’ of 
traditional society is embodied in the lack of theoretical alternatives, 
exemplified by an authoritarian imposition of unanimously received 
knowledge and values. Such unanimity of knowledge, he claims, is 
so strong that any challenge to it threatens stability and “evokes 
intense anxiety” in the traditional culture (pp. 154-155). 
 Undoubtedly, Horton’s conclusions descend from the chorus 
of elaborate rationalization of European ethnocentrism embedded 
in the discussions of Hume, Kant and Hegel.  The upshot of this is 
the disdain accorded to the modes of thought that do not accord with 
the assumptions of Western philosophical and scientific methods, 
for contemporary life. Such a degraded valuation of tradition is 
succinctly articulated in the Modernization School, which ruled 
theories of development from the end of the Second World War 
until the 1960s, and mutated into international economic policy as 
the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and later as Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in the 1980s and 1990s. A 
consensus has emerged that modernization theory portrays ‘Third 
World’ countries as ‘backward’ in comparison to countries in 
North America and Western Europe, conceived as  depositories of 
‘modern’ values, and prescribes modeling these societies on the 
development paths of the West as remedy for their backwardness 
(Himmelstrand,  1994, p. 37; So,  1990,  p. 36).
 The core claims of modernization are theoretically sustained 
by the assumptions of Functionalism. So (1990, p. 18), who 
supplies the perspective contends, in Huntington’s (1976) view, that 
modernization is a transformative process that renders “tradition” 
and “modernity” mutually exclusive (pp. 30-31). This perspective 
is derived from Talcott Parsons’s (1952) articulation of the concept 
of pattern variables, to distinguish traditional societies from 
modern ones and justify why a society’s traditional institutions and 
their values must be replaced in order for it to enter into modernity 
(p. 67). With this, modernization theory establishes a diametrical 
opposition between tradition and modernity, for if modernization 
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represents the apogee of social progress and requires discarding 
all vestiges of traditional culture, then the goods of tradition are 
perceived as impediments to the surge toward social progress, and 
therefore cannot remain on the path toward modernity. 
 The three Legon philosophers strenuously reject such 
pejorative appraisals of traditional thought. They highlight 
the value of heritage for philosophy, and advocate a critical 
appropriation of African traditional thought and practices. Gyekye 
identifies traditional resources as essential sources of philopraxis, 
Gyekye (1995, pp. 15-16), and for Wiredu, “exploiting as much 
as is judicious the resources of our own indigenous conceptual 
schemes in our philosophical meditations” is essential for 
conceptual decolonization in African philosophy (1996, p. 136). 
A tradition is neither static nor incompatible with modernity 
for these philosophers. In Gyekye’s (1997) view, a tradition is a 
cultural product that continues to inspire a wish for maintenance 
in subsequent generations because of its normative value to them 
(pp. 221-222). Subsequent generations may preserve, modify or 
discard an aspect of a tradition depending on whether they think 
it is good, bad, or sufficiently humane.  This account implies a 
struggle, namely, the struggle to develop normative standards to 
refine cultural goods, and to determine whether they have become 
worthless. It is these continual assessments by contemporary 
custodians of culture that refine its intellectual products into a 
tradition. In this sense the modern is nothing but refined tradition, 
for modernity involves “innovation aimed at bringing about 
the kinds of progressive changes in the entire aspects of human 
culture necessary for the enhancement and fulfillment of human 
life” (Gyekye, 1997, p. 280). For Gyekye then, a commitment to 
modernity is implied in the normative assessment that determines 
which aspects of traditions merit maintenance. For this reason 
Gyekye perceives no diametrical opposition between tradition and 
modernity. In his thinking, the two terms represent two points on 
a continuum, and this makes a clear-cut dichotomy between them 
implausible. Thus, Gyekye foresees and expects modern African 
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life to necessarily emerge from traditional cultural life. 
 Wiredu likewise affirms the relevance of tradition to modern 
life. For him too, a tradition is neither resistant to change nor 
opposed to modernity. He considers aspects of traditional African 
philosophies as “living or fit to be resurrected” for contemporary 
life, and he prescribes conceptual clarification and reconstruction 
as methods for identifying and appropriating valuable normative 
elements embedded in these philosophies for modern life. (Wiredu, 
2004, p. 11). Similarly, the idea of grounding the African future in 
useful values of the past is central to Abraham’s thinking. In The 
mind of Africa, he insists that the guiding principles for formulating 
solutions to problems in the African future ought to be those 
authenticated in cultural experience (2015, p. 31). It is for this reason 
that “our interest in our own cultures [ought to be] directed towards 
the future… [and for us Africans to] make the best of our present 
human resources, which are largely traditional” (Abraham, 2015, 
p. 36). The tenor of Abraham’s utterances suggests that institutions 
and solutions are not “authenticated” if they are rooted in theoretical 
resources that ignore and perhaps even degrade African thought, in 
contradistinction to what modernization theory prescribes. 
 What the preceding paragraphs suggest is that the Legon 
philosophers appropriated the notions of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernism’ 
embedded in modernist thinking, and chartered a course of their 
own understanding and use of these concepts. Their account of 
tradition speaks to continual attempts to refine cultural goods, in 
order to facilitate quick identification of obsolete and perverted 
elements that ought to be discarded.  This means that a tradition 
needs neither constrain its bearers from conceiving theoretical 
alternatives to its organizing principles, nor prevent debate of the 
merits of these principles. For them, a tradition not only inspires 
its adherents to elaborate and defend its tenets, but also equips its 
bearers to refine its constitutive ideas and practices through critical 
assessment. These perspectives constitute a compelling rejection of 
the conclusions of the Western project of modernism, as articulated 
by Robin Horton and the Modernization School. 
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 It is clear too that the Legon philosophers appropriated 
the notion of modernity and employed it in ways that can be 
distinguished from the modernity of Horton and Modernization 
theory. The Legon philosophers, like modernists, agreed that 
modernity implies the expectation to harness human thought to 
promote better understanding of the world, and the self; and for 
the pursuit of moral progress and human happiness, as we have 
seen Habermas assert in Section Two of this paper. Gyekye echoes 
Habermas by defining modernity as involving “innovation aimed at 
bringing about the kinds of progressive changes in the entire aspects 
of human culture necessary for the enhancement and fulfillment of 
human life”. (Gyekye, 1997, p. 280). 
 In spite of such coincidence of understanding the Legon 
philosophers employed the notion of modernity to subvert 
Modernist ideals. Habermas (1981), for instance, acknowledges the 
modernist aspiration to apply human thought to develop objective 
science to promote the control of natural forces (1981, pp. 8-9). For 
several Enlightenment and later modernist thinkers, this aspiration 
meant overthrowing the religious tedium of the Dark Ages through 
scientific domination of nature. William Leiss (1994) quotes from 
the The new organon (1620) Francis Bacon’s expectation that once 
the human race assumes the right over nature “which belongs to 
it by divine bequest, the exercise thereof will be guided by sound 
reason and true religion” (p. 189).  Bacon was clearly mistaken. 
As Harvey (2003) observes, history has demonstrated sufficiently 
that the rationality of such domination “entailed the domination 
of human beings that could only lead, in the end, to a nightmare 
condition of self-domination” (p. 271). 
 It appears that the social machinery required to administer 
levelheaded control over science lacked the power of restraint, for 
as Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) observe, scientific power over 
human beings weakens with “every step human beings take away 
from the power of nature” (p. 30). Scientific domination over nature 
is matched by increased domination by some people over others. 
But neither reason nor religion has been capable of stemming the 
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tendency of science to simultaneously create and destroy, and the 
active threat to humanity by its applications for wanton destruction 
of the environment; and by stockpiling nuclear weapons through 
the doctrine of MAD10.The Legon philosophers adopted the notion 
of modernity and believed in its transformative powers. But for 
them, it did not imply domination of the natural and social world. 
Rather, much could be said for the idea of modernity involving an 
ethic of non-denomination of man by man, and for man’s judicious 
usage of the resources of the natural world. The non-exploitative 
orientation of their philosophy, at the social level, is illustrated 
by their humanistic leanings, which in turn descends from their 
endorsement of the communitarian outlook of Akan societies.
 Wiredu installed humanism as the foundation of morals 
(1980, p. 6; 1992, pp. 193-194; 1996, pp. 65, 74-75, 193-195) 
in the modern world. In stressing the importance of assigning 
to human beings the grounds of morals, he appeals to a maxim 
that constitutes a fundamental precept of traditional Akan moral 
thinking. This is onipa na ohia, to which he (1992, p. 194, 201) 
assigns two complementary meanings. According to him it means 
first, that, “human interest is the basis of all values”; and second, 
that “human fellowship is the most important of human needs”. 
These two meanings yield the view that a human being must 
have ultimate value in all human considerations, and that what is 
morally good is what befits a human being. And for Wiredu, what 
befits a human being is what “brings dignity, respect, contentment, 
prosperity, joy, to man and his community” (1992, p. 6). In my 
view, a corollary of onipa na ohia as a moral first principle in Akan 
thought is onipa hia mmoa, or “a human being deserves help” or 
“ought to be helped.” This latter precept follows from the stress 
on human sociality emanating from Wiredu’s second construal 
of onipa na ohia, and when added, the appeal of onipa na ohia 
strengthens the moral prescription for a “sympathetic identification 
of the interests of a person with those of others even at the cost of 
10    Mutual assured destruction (MAD) is a doctrine of military strategy, based on deterrence, 
in which a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by opposing sides that would cause the complete 
annihilation of both the attacker and the defender is considered sufficient deterrence from the use of 
it by either party. It is what sustains the proliferation of nuclear weapons
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a possible abridgement of one’s own interests” (Wiredu, 1992, p. 
193).  In his view, such adjustment of human interests, emanating 
from the belief that the human being has ultimate value in all 
considerations, is the means to which the moral end of human well-
being is secured in contemporary times without exploitation. 
 Gyekye (1997) likewise explicitly advocates for the modern 
world, a humanism grounded in the communitarian convictions of 
traditional Akan society (pp. 259-260).  He considers the human 
being to be a being that is necessarily in need of social relations and 
mutual interdependence for adequate self-realization (p. 39). This 
in turn necessitates cooperation and sympathy for others. These 
views are elaborated in his communitarian theory that assigns equal 
moral worth of person and community, and in which he conceived 
common good as the social conditions that enables each individual 
to function satisfactorily in human society (p. 64), and support her 
escaping a “cramped and shackled self, responding robotically to the 
ways and demands of the communal structure” (pp. 55-56). Thus, 
Gyekye’s moderate communitarian theory, which he advocates for 
adoption to foster social formation in contemporary Africa, seeks 
to promote the common good of mutual concern for one another 
without violating individual rights or degrading the dignity of an 
individual. As such, it dismisses the exploitation of man by man.  
Conclusion
 The foregoing validates the claim that the Legon philosophers 
perceived no diametrical opposition between tradition and 
modernity. In their thinking, the two terms represent two points on 
a continuum, and this renders a clear-cut dichotomy between them 
implausible. They do not assertively argue against the modernist 
framework of knowledge and values, but work through its concepts 
to reject some of its conclusions, such as those of modernization 
theory. In so doing, they theorize those concepts in ways that are 
consistent with post-modernist perspectives. But there is no visible 
inclination on their part to discard the framework of modernity as 
the majority of postmodernists advocate. Rather, they have worked 
to reform elements of modernity to serve the goal of constructing a 
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humanistic African philosophy that speaks to contemporary needs. 
Thus, their trans-modernist praxis is clearly illustrated in their 
philosophy of tradition and modernity.
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